The Impending Demise of Resale Price Maintenance by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1970 Issue 1 
January 1970 
The Impending Demise of Resale Price Maintenance 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
The Impending Demise of Resale Price Maintenance, 1970 WASH. U. L. Q. 68 (1970). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss1/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
THE IMPENDING DEMISE OF RESALE PRICE
MAINTENANCE
For whatever reason, many manufacturers have utilized various
schemes to set the price at which their vendees resell their products.
These efforts, whether done by explicit agreement or otherwise, are
limited by the antitrust laws. Recent decisions significantly constrict
the range of action lawfully available to such manufacturers. This Note
seeks to demonstrate that this continued constriction, accompanied by
the gradual decline in number of fair trade states, was evolutionarily
inevitable under the antitrust laws.
I. OBITUARY FOR RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
Resale price maintenance' is usually effected by one of three
methods; fair trade, refusals to deal, or consignment contracts.
However, little vitality remains in resale price maintenance today since
none of the three is realistically available to manufacturers.
A. Fair Trade
State fair trade acts permit the adoption of a resale price
maintenance program2 for any commodity 3 sold under the trademark
of the producer or owner which is in free and open competition 5 with
I. Resale price maintenance refers to the practice of vertical price fixing whereby the
manufacturer sets in advance the price at which persons on a different level of distribution must
sell his trademarked product. For example, the manufacturer fixes the price at which the
wholesaler must resell the manufacturer's product to the retailer, and the price at which the
retailer must resell to the consumer. Resale price maintenance, or vertical price fixing, is
distinguished from horizontal price fixing in that the latter concerns fixing of prices by persons
on the same level of distribution, i.e. competitors. See generally I R. CALLMAN, TiE LAW OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK & MONOPOLIES § 22.1 et seq. (3d ed. 1967).
2. Fair trade acts in some states authorize the manufacturer to fix minimum resale prices, while
others authorize absolute resale price fixing. See 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 6041.
3. The great majority of state fair trade acts define the word commodity as "any subject of
commerce." See 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 6172.
4. Several fair trade acts permit the sale of d commodity at a price other than the stipulated
price when the trademark or brandname is removed or obliterated and not referred to in the
advertisement.or sale of the commodity. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 6045. For other exempted
sales, seeid. at 6218-36.
5. A patent does not ipso facto preclude the manufacturer from fixing resale prices pursuant
to state fair trade acts. See Glen Raven Knitting Mills v. Sanson Hosiery Mills, Inc., 189 F.2d
845 (4th Cir. 1951); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Siegel, 150 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1956). Copyrighted articles
may also be in free and open competition. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592 (2d
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commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by
others. In a typical fair trade contract the purchaser agrees to resell
only at prices set by the manufacturer. The purchaser may also agree,
in the event he resells to other distributors, to require them to resell
only at a stipulated price.' In this fashion the manufacturer can
determine the price to be paid for his products by wholesalers, retailers
and consumers.
Fair trade statutes also may permit "non-signer" provisions, which
make fair trade contracts enforceable against anyone who willfully sells
fair traded products at a price other than that stipulated by the
manufacturer, even though the seller is not a party to the contract.!
Because the provision binds all distributors within the particular state
to the fair trade contract price, a manufacturer need make only a single
fair trade contract, provided all distributors are properly notified.' The
non-signer provision is obviously the heart of fair trade, since few
distributors would be willing to enter into fair trade contracts if non-
signers were free to sell at any price.
Fair trade contracts are essentially price-fixing agreements and, as
such, contravene the antitrust laws whenever interstate commerce is
involved.' Hence, state fair trade acts would be of no utility to
manufacturers of products distributed nationally had not Congress
carved out an exception to the antitrust laws. The Miller-Tydings Act"
and McGuire Act" are merely enabling acts for state legislation; the
Acts allow fair trade contracts to be enforced in any "fair trade
state."'1 2 A resale price maintenance program cannot be based on the
federal legislation alone.
Cir.), cert. denied, 330 US. 828 (1947) (sole manufacturer of color film not allowed to fair trade
because color film not in free and open competition with other articles of same class); Hutzler
Bros. Co. v. Remington Putnam Book Co., 186 Md. 210,46 A.2d 101 (1946).
6. For an example of a fair trade contract see 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 6051-52.
7. E g. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 16904 (Deering 1960); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAWS
ANN § 369-b (McKinney 1968).
8 E.g., Revlon Nail Enamel Corp. v. Charmely Drug Shop, 123 N.J. Eq. 301, 197 A. 661
(1938). Plaintiff manufacturer of nail polish made fair trade contract with only one of its retailers.
The retailer sold less than a dozen bottles of nail polish in three months, nevertheless the single
fair trade contract was held sufficient to bind all other retailers with notice.
9 I R CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK & MONOPOLIES § 22.1
at 772 (3d ed. 1967); see Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
II. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). For a historical analysis of fair trade and the federal enabling acts
see Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. RV. 825
(1955); Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 175 (1954).
12 For a discussion of the history of the two Acts, see I R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
CoMPE-rITION. TRADEMARK & MONOPOLIES § 22.2 (3d ed. 1967).
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Despite the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts, fair trade has lost
much of its vitality as a means of effecting a uniform and effective
resale price maintenance system for a nationwide or multistate
distribution of products. Although at one time 46 states had fair trade
legislation, 3 19 acts have been held unconstitutional as applied to non-
signers,'14 four have been struck down in whole's and four others have
been repealed."6 Thus, only 18 state fair trade acts remain with effective
non-signer provisions. 7 In addition, the Supreme Court held in United
States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.' s that a vertically integrated
manufacturer may not enter into resale contracts with purchasers who
compete with him. Restated, if a company is both a manufacturer and
wholesaler, it may not enter into fair trade contracts with independent
wholesalers. Since approximately 75 percent of all fair trade
manufacturers are at least partially integrated, 9 the McKesson &
Robbins decision is a serious blow to fair trade resale price
maintenance systems; it forces the vertically integrated manufacturer to
choose some other method of price control such as refusal to deal.
B. Refusal to Deal
In United States v. Colgate"' the Supreme Court recognized that a
manufacturer engaged in private business has a right to refuse to deal,
and to announce in advance the conditions under which he will do so.
However, the Colgate doctrine permits only simple unilateral action;
even in the absence of an express agreement a manufacturer may be
found to have entered into an unlawful combination."' If a
13. See 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 6041. Alaska, Missouri, Texas and Vermont have never
enacted fair trade laws. Id. at 6017.
14. Id. at 6041. Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Washington, West Virginia.
15. Id. Alabama, Montana, Utah, Wyoming.
16. Id. Hawaii, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada.
17. Id. Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennesse, Wisconsin, Maine.
18. 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
19. Comment, Resale Price Maintenance by an Integrated Firm: The McKEssoN & RoBBINS
Case, 24 U. CI. L. Rv. 533, 539 n.42 (1957). See generally Weston, Resale Price Maintenance
& Market Integration: Fair Trade or Foul Play?, 22 GEo. WASH. L. REy. 658, 673-80 (1954).
20. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
21. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1949); Frey & Son, Inc.
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921); United States v. A. Schrader's Sons, Inc., 252 U.S.
85 (1920).
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manufacturer refuses to deal in order to coerce wholesalers and
retailers to cooperate in a system of resale price maintenance, he has
exceeded the limits of Colgate.22
The problem of determining at what point a manufacturer has gone
beyond a simple unilateral refusal to deal and created an unlawful
combination was dealt with in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.23
There, the defendant-manufacturer adopted a system of "suggested"
resale prices for its wholesale and retail outlets. Defendant's
representatives visited wholesalers and advised them that they would be
cut off if they either did not adhere to suggested resale prices or sold
defendant's products to non-complying retailers. Defendant Parke,
Davis also advised individual retailers that if they would adhere to the
suggested prices, other retailers would do the same. Retailers cut off
for non-compliance would be reinstated upon giving adequate
assurance that they would follow the suggested prices in the future. The
Supreme Court found that Parke, Davis had gone beyond a simple
unilateral refusal to deal in two specific ways: by threatening not to
deal, it forced wholesaler cooperation in a plan to achieve compliance
among retailers and it used the report of each retailer's willingness to
cooperate as a "lever" to obtain acquiescence from all. 24 Thus, the
Parke, Davis Court tested the legality of the refusal to deal by the
manner in which it was used. It is not unlawful for each customer to
independently adhere to the "suggested" price even though induced to
do so solely by the manufacturer's announced policy "[slo long as
Colgate is not overruled."25 But the manufacturer may not employ his
right to refuse to deal as a means of coercing compliance with his
policy-after announcing it he must do nothing further to "actively
bring about" compliance.26
A still further tightening of the Colgate doctrine occurred in
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 27 which expanded the definition of
"combination. 2 8 Albrecht was an independent contractor who
22. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
23. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
24. Id at 45.
25. Id. at 44.
26. Id. at 46.
27. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
28. The Court also held that fixing a maximum price by means of a refusal to deal may
violate § I of the Sherman Act. It is more common for a manufacturer to attempt to set the
minimum resale price. For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see Note, Albrecht v. Herald
Co. -Resale Price Fixing, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 862, 864 (1969).
Vol. 1970: 5421
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delivered the defendant-publisher's newspapers in an exclusive delivery
territory. The Herald Co. printed a maximum resale price in each
paper and announced that it would terminate the contract of any
carrier who failed to comply. When Albrecht began selling above the
suggested price, The Herald Co. engaged a sales firm to solicit
Albrecht's customers and another carrier to deliver to them. The
second carrier, who was willing to comply with the maximum price,
understood that it would retain the customers only so long as Albrecht
refused to cooperate. As Albrecht did not acquiesce, The Herald Co.
refused to sell him papers, thereby forcing him to sell his route. The
Court held that illegal combinations existed between the publisher and
the soliciting firm and between the publisher and the second carrier.29
These combinations differ from those found in previous cases in that
neither the soliciting firm nor the second carrier had any interest in the
success of the price fixing scheme;3 the more usual case involves a
combination between the manufacturer and someone in his distribution
chain. 31 Furthermore, the Court suggested that Albrecht might have
alleged a combination between the publisher and himself or even
between the publisher and the ultimate consumer. 32 In short, the case
suggests that once the publisher employed coercive tactics in
conjunction with a refusal to deal, an unlawful combination between
it and someone would be found.
Although the right to refuse to deal may retain some theoretical
vitality as a method of resale price maintenance,3 it surely is dead from
a planning standpoint.Y The line between "simple unilateral" action
and an unlawful coercive combination has been substantially blurred.
29. 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
30. See Note, Albrecht v. Herald Co.-Resale Price Fixing, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 862, 868
(1969).
31. See, e.g., cases cited in note 21, supra.
32. 390 U.S. at 150 n.6.
33. Compare Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 825, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1964),
with United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 57 (1960) (dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan).
34. See George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960):
The Supreme Court has left a narrow channel through which a manufacturer may pass
even though the facts would have to be of such Doric simplicity as to be somewhat rare
in this day of complex business enterprise; . ...
Id. at 790; 1 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK &
MONOPOLIES § 22.2 at 772 (3d ed. 1967). But see Dart Drug Corp. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 344
F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Parke, Davis notified a dealer that it had permanently closed his
account-held to be "purely unilateral"); House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Patterns Co.,
298 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (apparently facts of "Doric simplicity").
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If a manufacturer desires an effective resale price maintenance system,
he must develop an enforcement program which will discover price
violations and deal with noncomplying distributors. While Colgate
recognizes the right of the manufacturer to cut off a noncomplying
distributor, the manufacturer may be reluctant to exercise that right.
On the contrary, he probably would rather retain outlets for his
products.35 This may cause the manufacturer to employ his right to
refuse to deal as a coercive economic weapon forcing compliance upon
a price-cutting distributor. If he does so, however, he goes beyond
"simple refusal to deal," and violates the antitrust laws. When one
contrasts, as did Justice Harlan,31 the ". . . aggressive, widespread,
highly organized and successful merchandizing programs . . ."38 in
previous cases with the ". . . defensive, limited, unorganized and
unsuccessful effort . . ."39 in Parke, Davis, it is clear that the range
of manufacturer conduct which will not amount to a coercive
program-as distinct from simple unilateral refusal to deal-is
perilously narrow. The utility of the Colgate doctrine is further limited
by the Albrecht extension of "combination." It is unlikely that The
Herald Co. considered that it would be in an unlawful "combination"
with the soliciting firm or second carrier, and certainly not with its
readers.
C. Consignment Contracts
The Albrecht and Parke, Davis decisions concerned the use of refusal
to deal as a coercive weapon forcing independent distributors to comply
with a "suggested" resale price maintenance system. Those decisions
left open the possibility of establishing a resale price maintenance
program by use of consignment contracts. This technique eliminates
resale from price control because the manufacturer retains title to the
goods-he merely entrusts them to one who is to sell for him. Such
an arrangement was upheld in United States v. General Electric Co.40
In that case GE entered into agreements with more than 21,000 agents
all over the United States for the sale of its light bulbs. The agreement
provided, inter alia, that GE would retain title to the bulbs until sold
35. This is clearly illustrated by the action of both Parke, Davis and the Herald Co. Both made
earnest efforts to obtain voluntary compliance before using coercive tactics of any kind.
36. See notes 23-26, supra, and accompanying text.
37. United States v. Parke, Davis a Co., 362 U.S. 29, 55-56 (1960).
38. Id. at 56.
39. Id.
40. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
Vol. 1970: 542]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss1/7
74 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1970: 542
to the customer and would also specify prices; the agents agreed to
stock the bults, account to GE for sales, pay most expenses and return
unsold bulbs if the agency was terminated. The Court held that "...
genuine contracts of agency. . ." do not violate the antitrust laws."
The owner of an article patented or otherwise is not violating the
common law or the Antitrust Law by seeking to dispose of his articles
directly to the consumer and fixing the price by which his agents transfer
the title from him directly to such consumer."
In Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,4 3 Union Oil used a consignment
arrangement for the sale of its gasotine at filling stations which it
leased to the dealers. Although the consignment agreement was very
similar to that used by GE,44 the Court nevertheless held "that resale
price maintenance through the present, coercive type of 'consignment'
agreement is illegal under the antitrust laws . . . ."1 The majority of
the Court sought to distinguish General Electric, but most
commentators agree that Simpson in effect overrules General Electric."
Even if not, the close similarity of the two consignment agreements4"
gives warning that a resale price maintenance program ought not be
planned in reliance on the consignment device. If, as is likely, the
agreement in Simpson was written with the GE agreement as its
model,4" it would surely be at least imprudent to initiate a resale price
maintenance program using the consignment device. A number of cases
have been decided since Simpson, 49 but they offer little aid in
determining its meaning. °
41. Id. at 488.
42. Id.
43. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
44. See Rahl, Control of an Agent's Prices: The Simpson Case-a Study in Antitrust Analysis,
61 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1966).
45. 377 U.S. 13,24 (1964).
46. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 29 (1964) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Stewart); 1 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK & MONOPOLIES § 25
at 894 (3d ed. 1967); Rahl, Control of an Agent's Prices: The Simpson Case-a Study in
Antitrust Analysis, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1966).
47. See note 43, supra.
48. See Comment, Consignment for Retail Maintenance Invalidated by Supreme Court, 17
STAN. L. REv. 519, 521-22 (1965).
49. Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 350 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 982 (1966);
Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965); Guidry v. Continental Oil
Co., 350 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1965); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 344 F.2d 599 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 939 (1965); CBS Business Eqmt. Corp. v. Underwood Corp., 240 F. Supp. 413
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
50. See I R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK & MONOPOLIES § 25
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II. THE INEVITABLE RESULT?
The demise of resale price maintenance, particularly in the format
of fair trade laws, may be only the inevitable result of its logically
inconsistent position within the framework of antitrust law. Vertical
price fixing agreements between the manufacturer and the reseller of his
products are prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act. 51 Continuing
judicial pressure exhibited in the progeny of Dr. Miles has foreclosed,
as a practical matter, other available methods of resale price
maintenance. Contrariwise, the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts
enable states to legislatively authorize resale price maintenance
contracts. 2 This permits the legitimation on a state-by-state basis of
business arrangements proscribed by section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The basic principle of antitrust is that the unrestricted competitive
process will produce a viable economy with a minimum of political
interference. 53 The competitive process derives its strength as an
ordering mechanism from the existence of numerous independent offers
of interchangeable goods to the market.54 Axiomatic to this scheme is
the belief that the competitive process suffers when two independent
competitiors agree to fix prices.m Resale price maintenance eliminates
competition between retailers by fixing the price at which all retailers
will offer a particular product.56 The result is the substitution of
at 894 (3d ed. 1967); Rahl, Control of an Agent's Prices: The Simpson Case-A Study in
Antitrust Analysis, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 6 (1966).
51. Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S.
13 (1964); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. McKesson
a Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956); cf., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373, 406-09 (1911); Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65
COLUM. L REv. 422, 432-33 (1965); Levi, The Park-Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on Resale
Price Maintenance, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 258.
52. Miller-Tydings Act 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964); McGuire Act 66 STAT.
632 (1952). 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964); Herman, Fair Trade: Origins, Purposes, and Competitive
Effects, 27 Go. WASH. L. Rav. 621, 627 (1959). But see H.R. REp. No. 1516, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1952). Hearing on a proposed amendment to § 1 of the Sherman Act precipitated by
the Supreme Court's decision in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384
(1951). The proposals contained therein were eventually reflected in the McGuire Act. 66 STAT.
632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
53. See Blake a Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 382-83 (1965).
54. Bernhard, Competition in Lawandin Economics, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1099, 1130 (1967).
55 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Blake & Jones, Toward a Three Dimensional Antitrust Policy,
65 COLUM. L. Rav. 422,430 (1965).
56. H.R. 1516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1952); Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional
Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422, 432-33 (1965); Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects
Vol. 1970: 542]
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competition at the producers level only for the numerous competitive
forces of the retail market that would effect a products retail price51
This clearly restricts the competitive process. To allow its creation by
agreement is repugnant to the basic principles of antitrust. Thus, the
statutory exemption created by the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts
creates a conflict within the framework of antitrust.
To justify exempting such agreements from the complete prohibition
by section 1 of the Sherman Act, it was necessary for the proponents
of the exemption to demonstrate that the forces of unrestrained price
competition at the retail level produce greater restrictions on the
competitive process than does resale price maintenance. This is the
central theme of the proponents' arguments in favor of resale price
maintenance. They maintain that unrestricted price competition at the
retail level is so injurious to some components of the manufacturing,
wholesaling and retailing process that it results in their destruction.5
This reduces competition and causes a tendency toward monopoly at
the different functional levels, thereby restricting the competitive
process to a much greater degree than it is restricted by resale price
maintenance."
The enabling act character of the Statutory exemption created
natural laboratories in which the effects of competition both with and
without resale price maintenance could be analyzed. There were at one
time 46 such laboratories6O but the gradual abandonment of fair trade
has reduced this number to 18.61 These states provided proponents of
resale price maintenance with the opportunity to show that its existence
produced a less restrictive effect on the competitive process than did
the forces of price competition at the retail level.
As the record was made in states authorizing resale price
maintenance, one thing became apparent. The retail prices paid by
consumers for price maintained goods were slightly higher than prices
of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 84849 (1955); Herman, Fair Trade:
Origins, Purposes, and Competitive Effects, 27 GEo. WASil. L. REV. 621, 645-47 (1959).
57. Herman, Fair Trade: Origins, Purposes, and Competitive Effects, 27 GEo. WASH, L. REV.
621, 645-47 (1959).
58. See, e.g., H.R. 1516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-12 (1952); Bowman, The Prerequisites and
Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 836 (1955); Herman, Fair Trade:
Origins, Purposes, and Competitive Effects, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 621, 632 (1959). See
generally V. MUND, GOVERNMIENT AND BUSINESS, 474-81,484 (1955).
59. See note 10, supra, and authorities cited therein.
60. See text accompanying notes 13 to 17, supra.
61. Id.
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for the same merchandise in non-fair trade states." This data does not
provide a basis for justifying the exemption of resale price maintenance
agreements from the reach of the basic principles of antitrust. The
record of other effects on the competitive process precipitated by the
presence or absence of resale price maintenance is inconclusive. There
is some data, however, indicating that the feared destruction of business
concerns and resulting monopolization at the retail level of the market
by a few giants has not occurred in non-fair trade jurisdictions.6 The
only conclusions offered by neutral parties on the effect of resale price
maintenance is that its presence within the competitive process only
retards change that might otherwise occur through the mechanism of
co mpetition."
It is submitted that the inconclusiveness of the above record does
indicate that resale price maintenance in practice has failed to justify
its existence in contradiction of the basic principles of antitrust. The
destructive results from competition without resale price maintenance
feared by its proponents have not occurred. By reason of this failure
to proof, the conflict created by fair trade laws within the framework
of antitrust is gradually resolving itself in favor of the basic principles
of free competition. This may be simply an inevitable result when the
theoretically predicted results used to justify the creation of a logically
inconsistent antitrust exemption failed to materialize in actual practice.
The natural tendency was to return to a pattern of regulation consistent
with the basic principles governing the regulatory sheme itself.
CONCLUSION
Whether there exists, outside the context of state fair trade laws, a
theoretically legal system of resale price maintenance is questionable.
62. H.R. 1516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42 (1952); Statement of W.H. Orrick, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, on S. 774 Before the Special
Subcomm of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1964) cited in 9
ANTITRUST BULL. 785, 795-800 (1964); Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price
Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 825, 849-73 (1955).
As with any empirical data, the above figures are subject to the criticism that there was
insufficient control over all of the possible variables for the results to be truly reflective of the
effect of resale price maintenance on retail prices paid by the consumer. See Frankel, The Effect
of Fair Trade: Fact and Fiction in the Statistical Findings, 28 J. Bus. 182-94 (1955). What is
noteworthy, however, is the complete absence of such statistical surveys offered by the proponents
of resale price maintenance to refute the clear implications of the above data.
63. See H.R. 1516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 43-46 (1952); Herman, Fair Trade: Origins, Purposes,
and Competitive Effects, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 621, 637-39 (1959).
64. Skeoch, Canada at 60 and Hollander, United States of America at 100 in RESALE PRICE
MAINTENANCE (Yamey ed. 1966).
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As a practical matter, the alternatives to fair trade-refusals to deal
and consignment arrangements-have been restricted into oblivion by
continuing judicial pressure from the Supreme Court. The passage of
time also has precipitated substantial inroads into the one remaining
sanctuary for resale price maintenance-states with "nonsigner-
provision" fair trade laws. The number of such jurisdictions has
dwindled from a one-time high of 46 to 18. This record, viewed as a
whole, could suggest that the continued existence of resale price
maintenance is doubtful. It is not unreasonable to assume that this
result was the inevitable end to the law's resolution of an illogical
exception to a basic principle that fails to justify its existence in fact.
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